FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of
its objectives. In return, this contingency requires the intensification
of
our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.
  Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement
of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:
  "14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within
the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable
power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system.
  "15. The political, economic, -and psychological warfare which the
U.S.S.R. is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the
relative world position of the United States and disrupting its tradi-
tional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance
is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist
countries.
  "16. The risk of war with the U.S.S.R. is sufficient to warrant, in
common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United
States.
       "a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet
    leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving
    the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate
    resort to war cannot be ruled out.
       "b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing
     danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation
     of the determination of the United States to use all the means at
     its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinter-
     pretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of
     Soviet reactionsto measures which we might take.
  "17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether
achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means,
would be' strategically and politically unacceptable to the -United
States.
   "18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the
 event of war to cope with threats to its securityor to gain its objectives
 would be severely weakened by internal development, important among
 which are:
       "a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly
by
     concerted and well-directed communist activity.
       "b., Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.
       "c. Internal political and social disunity.
       "d. Inadequate   or  excessive  armament or     foreign  aid
     expenditures.
       "e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of
     peace.
       "f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation
     or appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of
     its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.
       "g. Development of a false sense of security through a
     deceptive change in Soviet tactics."


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