REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS


bution of fissionable material in'such a way as to minimize the effects
of possible withholding."
  Although much thinking and staff studies have been directed toward
the problem of stages and strategic distribution (also called s'trategic
balance and quotas), no specific proposals on these points have been
made by the-United States for reasons that are best stated in the Third
Report of the UNAEC dated May 17,1948.
  "The problems which have not been elaborated in detail, i.e.,
organization and administration, financing, strategic balance, pro-
hibitions, and enforcement, and the stages of transition from the
present situation to one of full international control, are of a different
nature. These questions do not affect the basic nature of the problem of
control. Some questions, such as stages, which only concern the period
of transition to full international control, will be conditional on future
technological developments and the conditions of world security. The
same considerations apply to the question of the strategic balance to
be established in the location of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors
between one part of the globe and another. Others, such as organiza-
tion and administration of the agency-on which inconclusive dis-
cussions have recently taken place-and the question of the agency's
finances, depend almost entirely on the existence of prior agreement
on the nature and extent of the control system. Indeed, until agree-
ment on the basic principles of control has been reached, the elabora-
tion of proposals to cover these remaining topics would be unrealistic
and would serve no useful purpose. On the other hand, given such
agreement, solutions to these problems could be worked out."
  The AEC also indicated that it might be desirable, if the opportunity
arose, to tighten up certain parts of the plan by strengthening the
controls over- heavy water, and" by naming the appropriate lighter
elements as coming under the controls of the international agency,
although the general language of the plan had been deliberately chosen
to cover both fissionable and fusionable materials.
   In expressing these views, the AEC scrupulously limited itself only
to the technical aspects of the problem. Quite properly, it did not
make any analysis of broader political considerations, such as the
political climate, the existing or prospective power relationships be-
tween the East and West, and the relationship between atomic energy
control and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments
and armed forces, which have a great bearing on whether the U.S.
can afford to continue its support for the UN plan. The prime political
consideration which must be kept in mind, and which is stressed in
NSC/68, is that acceptance of effective international control by the
Soviet Union would mean a fundamental change in the character of


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