FOREIGN RELATIONS) 19 5 0, VOLUME I


guit from a disintegration of. the dictatorship, as has always happened
in the past. I think what we must recognize is that we must keep our
belts tight until such time as this disintegration does occur, which
may well be a very long period of time. The inherent difficulty in this
situation is that the Kremlin cannot afford to let their people come in
,contact with Western ideas land Western people as this would destroy
their existing hold on the situation. I cannot conceive of any settle-
ment with the Kremlin which would be satisfactory which did not
involve the lifting of the Iron Curtain. There is also an implication
in this paragraph that we should not enter into negotiations with -the
Kremlin until we have built up strength. Although recognizing the
iutility of such a negotiation at this time or for any foreseeable
iuture, I am of the opinion, and this I think was shared in by the
'Ambassadors in Rome, that we should 'be willing to talk at any time
but do it in an atmosphere where it is perfectly clear that itris they and
not we who are blocking a settlement.
   In going through the report to the President, I picked up several
 detailed points which I attach on a separate sheet.0 These may or
 may not be of sufficient importance to justify their consideration.
   G.Attachment not reproduced.

 Policy Planning Staff Files
 Memorrnd4m     y the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations
            Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State':
 TOP   CRT        -    "               [WAsHINGTON,] April 5, 1950.

   I have carefully studied the two fpapers resulting from the work of
 the State-Defense study group which were sent to me with Mr. Webb's
 memorandum of March'30,1950.
    I 'agree with the conclusions set forth in these papers and with the
  recommendations to the President, subject to the following comments:
    1, OUr principal allies, certainly the Unitd Kingdom and France,
  and perhaps. Canada, should be consulted before we reach ,a decision in
  this matter. The factsshould be laid before .them and those govern-
  ments should concur in the decision 'and -agree to do their full part
  in the buildup of political, economic and military strength, recom-
  mended in these papers. I have every confidence that they will agree,
  but there must be no doubt whatever about ,their agreement 'and ,their

  .'Transmitted -through Under-Secretairy Webb.-


216