FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1950, VOLUME I


  Dr. Conant stated that he was not disagreeing too much with the
papers as a whole. He only felt that the Utopian objectives should not
be so much in the foreground and that more emphasis should be placed
on negotiating inthe interim. He felt that our strengthening should
be more than having more strategic bombers, and cautioned against
forgetting the United Kingdom. He pointed out that the uncertainty
of success of any attack in advance of being tried may (be a real
deterrent. He put the value of avoiding war very high and emphasized
the need for substitutes for strategic bombing.
  Mr. Nitze pointed out that we needed at present to equalize the
large army (of the Soviet Union). We needed something in order to
equalize the existing equation. Dr. Conant stated that by 1960 we
might be in a position to indicate that we would not use atomic
weapons except for retaliation if the Soviet Union were tostart ,a
nonblitz war.
  Dr. Conant emphasized that the program for speeding up 1960
requires both education and legislation. Mr. Nitze stated that we must
build up our non-atomic strength in order to give us a chance at
negotiation. Dr. Conant agreed, but repeated that direct and bilateral
negotiations with the U.S.S.R. were needed in order to got U.S. support
for the things that had to be done. He pointed out that the -United
Kingdom was scared and the French intellectuals were paralyzed.
With the hydrogen bomb in the picture, we must also be more secure
in the United States. The worst possible period would be when we
acquire knowledge of a successful development of a hydrogen bomb.
However, he was optimistic regarding U.S. morale in case of war
and did not assume that the Soviets would have one by 1960 unless
we too had one. In the case of the hydrogen bomb, the carrier is the
main problem, and he still questioned its technical feasibility as a
weapon. Even with hydrogen bombs, a 30-day warning was still
desirable.
   Regarding a point made by Mr. Arneson that it is almost impossible
 to negotiate with the Soviet Union because of the propaganda angle,
 Dr. Conant pointed out that we had the Atlantic Pact, which can be
 strengthened. In the U.N. we could continue to examine and debate.
 If we also approach the Soviet Union bilaterally and -they "'spill
the
 beans", we could use it against them by stating that we were trying
 to do everything we could to prevent a super-blitz.-
   Mr. Halaby asked whether there were any doubts that we must lead
 from material strength. Dr. Conant said no, but that depends on what
 is meant by strength. He emphasized that the greatest danger we face
 was the morale of the United Kingdom and Frenchh leaders, which
 was not being helped by current attempts to cut Marshall Plan aid.


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