FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


be the same in war as they are in peace, something that he felt had
not been very clear in the last two wars,
  D. Mr. Nitze then 'asked what changes had taken place since 1946
which might .technically affect the Baruch plan, ,and mentioned his
-understanding that the increased ability to process low-grade uranium
ores affected the inspection parts of the plan. Mr. Arneson also pointed
tout that as the Russians now know 'how to make a bomb, the period of
warning would be less, Dr. Smyth added that cores could be hidden in
caves and that this was a risk which grows with time as more :land
more are produced. He agreed with Mr. Nitze that the H-bomb.would
enhance thisfactor as it multiplies the damage which could be done by
hidden bombs, although there is a limit to the time during which they
could be stored. He also pointed out that there is one advantage in the
Situation now as compared with 1946, i.e., we know that they have
bombs and the- means of producing them so that they cannot say they
have nothing to inspect. Once we got ,people into ,these production
centers whose existence would have to be acknowledged, it would be
much easier to pick up leads !about others. Mr. Barnard, in commenting
that this would not help much in finding hidden ,plutonium, pointed
out that it would be very difficult if not .impossible ,to prove that our
own military hadn't hidden some. Mr. Nitze then asked if it were clear
as to what was now needed to build -a reactor. Dr. Smyth said that large
,amounts of power would probably be needed for some time to come,
Although there was a possibility that in the not too distant future
production 'plants might be able to produce their own 'power. He :said
that the unit itself need not be very large; and that although it would
be possible to detect a processing plant, with great difficulty and
tremendous cost due to the cooling problems one might-t conceivably
be designed which could 'be concealed. There 'is- no way of detecting
d'iffusion processes by radioactive methods. In sum, the only sure
guide ,for detection might be the presence of enoughwaterfor the
cooling apparatus, which-gave added emphasis to Mr., Nitze's state-
ment that he was more worried about the 'ability of the Russians to
produce more-bombs clandestinely 'after 'a control system had been
inaugurated ,than to ide some that they had already produced. Mr.
'Barnard said that 'he 'was. now-highly dubious whether one could tell
the American people that ,an ,agreement solely on atomic control would
  mean much in the ,way of security and that he did not think ihat he
  would want- to lend his name to such an assurance;. Mr. Lay -pointed
  out that, aside from the technicaliaspects, you would still.gain the
  political advantageof opening up the U.S.S.R.
  E :.,: Dr. Smyth raised the question of UN control -of weapons through
  its own police forcein- ownership of bombs and-the means of produc-,


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