FOREIGN ,LA-TO,- 1950 , VOLUME I


   Based-on these conclusions the NSRB3 does not concur with the
"Calculated risk" some agencies of the government-are willing to
take
that the Soviet will not attack usby- 1954 or earlier. If risk is implied
one. way or the other, the NSRB prefers to risk in the direction of
overt and organized planning to defend theUnited States as best it
can be defended between now and 1954 rather than risk millions of
lives and this country's survival on the chance the Soviet cannot or
will not attack the United Statesmin the next few years.
  The NSRB believes, therefore, that the basic issue: to be decided
before NSC/68 can be further interpreted and implemented in any
organized way as to programs and costs is:
  Are we or areI we not faced with the possibility of Soviet attack on
this country, and if so, in what form might the' attack come, and what
is the earliest date by which it might be of lethal impact?
                          CIVIL-DEFENE
  The Civil-Defense program implied by NSC/68 is submitted with
the qualification that it is for Ad Hoc Committee planning purposes
only.
  The NSRB emphasizes that, no program for mobilization being
available from the Defense Department, this tentative civil defense
program is based largely on NSRB's own informal assumptions of
criteria it must eventually receive from the Defense Department.
  Thes6 informal assumptions are as .follows:
  By mid-1954, at the'latest, the USSR will have the capability of
striking a lethal atomic blow at the United States.
  There is a strong possibility that the USSR will strike that blow.
  Such an atomic blow would come with as much surprise as possible
and would be on the order of     1 atomic or hydrogen bombs in
mid-1954;        more bombs by the end of 1954;       bombs dur-
Ing 1955 ;and       bombs during,1956.
  The original attack would be .½.ý against- the United States'
retalia-
tory force of strategic bombers, and 2/3 against vital or psychological
targets within the United States.
  The attack might come by air or sea, or both-and would be accom-
panied or preceded byý sabotage.
  The military service will need 16,000,000 men and women between
the ages of 18 and 43 inclusive.
  All other men, women and children, Will be applicable to the civil
defense program in either permanent or volunteer capacities.

  Based on these assumptions, the civil defense program will build as
thoroughly as time, money, and public education within security limits
will allow, toward meeting an atomic emergency in mid-1954 and for
at least three years of war thereafter.
  MThe blanks in this paragraph appear in the source text.


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