ATOMIC ENERGY


        as a deterrent to war, and we hold that any proposals which
        do nolt provide for effecative controls are illusory.
  13. In the light.of the President's announcement, should we make
anew approach -to the Russians, direct or through the United Nations,
in an effort to secure agreement for the internationl control of atomic
energy?
    We have never ceased to try to reach agreement with ,the U.S.S.R.
        on the problem of international control, and we are pre-
        pared, with other interested nations, to explore carefully and
        with good will any proposals from any source consonant
        with effective and enforceable control.
  14. Would the U.N. plan for the international control of atomic
energy, if established, cover the hydrogen bomb?
    Yes. The U.N. plan, if established, would apply to both 'atomic
        and hydrogen bombs.
  15. Will our work on the hydrogen bomb cause any serious reduc-
tion in our program looking to the development of aiomic energy for
peaceful purposes.
    No.
  16. If we develop this weapon, could we cut back our military
expenditures in other directions?
    No. No security program can rely on any single weapon.
  17. Were other than purely military considerations taken into
account in reaching the decision on the hydrogen bomb?
    Yes. The decision was based on all the factors involved, which
        obviously included moral, economic, and political, as well as
        military factors.

761.5211 Fuchs, K.F.J./2-1350
Memorandum     of Conversation by Air. Lucius D. Battle, Special
                 Assistant to the Secretary of State
TOP SECRET                        [WASINiiwGTON,] February 13, 1950.
  Sir Derick Hoyer Millar I called this afternoon at his request. In
conversation on other matters he asked me to inform the Secretary
that Mr. Bevin 2 was very much disturbed when he returned to London
to be faced with the Fuchs case.3 He said that Mr. Bevin had sent a
message to the Secretary which was now somewhat out of date. The
message was that he felt a deep concern about it and hoped that this
situation would not result in an "anti-British feeling arising in this
  1Minister, British Embassy.
  2Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
  ' See editorial note, p. 524.


527