NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


rapid advance of the U.S.S.R. from a backward society to a position
of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source
of a new universal faith and (b) the model "scientific" society,
the
Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of
large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an inter-
national crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.
   Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither
 institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration.
 The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength.
 It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet
 policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Krem-
 lin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical
 latitude, with stealth and with speed.
   The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of
 its relations with the Soviet people.
   That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear and
 denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only
 for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms
 of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain
 around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of natural
 cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been in-
 telligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of
 their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.
   The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is
 likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent
 emotional-political force. ýThe well-known ills of colonialism are
com-
 pounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its
 satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that
 they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility
 of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only
 through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to
 effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is
 likely to break away.
 In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and
 potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most funda-
 mental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed
 the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was capable of ful-
 filling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove
 to be fatally weak.
 The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vulnerability.
 In a system  where supreme power is acquired and held through
 violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may well pro-
duce a period of instability.


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