NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


weapons of mass destruction. It appears unlikely that the Soviet
Union would wait for such an attack before launching one of its own.
But even if it did and even if our attack were successful, it is clear
that the United States would face appalling tasks in establishing a
tolerable'state of order among nations after such a war and after
Soviet occupation of all or most of Eurasia for some years. These
tasks appear so enormous and success so unlikely that reason dictates
an attempt to achieve our objectives by other means.
C. The Third Course-War.
   Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against
 the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the
 idea of "preventive" war-in the sense of a military attack not
pro-
 xroked by a military attack upon us or our allies-is generally un-
 acceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet
 Union is in fact at war with the free world now and thatsince the
 failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable
 on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves
 accordingly. Some further argue that the free world is probably
 unable, except under the crisis of war, to mobilize and direct its re-
 sources to the checking and rolling back of the ,Kremlin's drive for
 world dominion. This is a powerful argument in the light of history,
 but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free
 world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong. The case for
 war is premised on the assumption that the United States could launch
 and sustain an attack of sufficient impact to gain-a decisive advantage
 for the free-world in a long war and perhaps to win an early decision.
 The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive opera-
 tions is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow
 could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that
 these operations alone would not force or induce-the Kremlin to capitu-
 late and -that the Kremlin would still be -able to use the forces under
 its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia, This would probably
 mean a 1lng and difficult struggle during which the free institutions
 of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be de-
 stroved and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a
 crippling blow,
 Apar from .this, however, a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union,
 despitethe provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repug-
 nant to :many Americans. Although the American people would prob-
 ably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for
 a surprise.attack would be morally corrosive. Many would doubt that
 it was a ",just.war"--and that ,all reasonable possibilities-for
a peaceful
settlement .had .been explored in good-faith. Many more, proportion-
ately, would hold such views in other countries, particularly in West-


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