FOREIGN RELATIONS, - 1950, 'VOLUME I


plans for the organization of such units in an inter-American force,
and put itself in a position to render technical advice to the respective
governments.
  It is recognized that the initiation of such a program will involve
certain risks. It will be stated, for example: (1)%that such grant aid
for Latin America will detract from U.S. military aid to other areas
whose needs have a higher priority, (2) that the Korean experience
has proved that few Latin American countries actually desire to par-
ticipate in possible U.N. action beyond the hemisphere or even beyond
their own territory, (3) that such aid will strengthen the military
juntas now in control in some countries and others which aspire to
control to the disparagement of democratic processes, (4) that the
units which may receive such aid will gain so much in strength and
prestige that jealousy and demoralization of other military units in
the same country will result, (5) that the U.S. will be accused of
seeking to create mercenary forces under U.N. auspices.
  With regard to these points, however, it may be pointed out that:
  (1) The aid initially given will probably not be extensive, since the
units Latin American countries agree to maintain for such purposes
are not likely to be large. Unless the free world suffers an early and
sharp reversal, the program should be-developed gradually and should
concentrate on the creation of relatively small units from a number
of countries rather than large ones from a few. Under any circum-
stances, the importance of the long range objeotive to be gained should
weigh heavily ini determining and assigning priorities. (2) 'In spite
of the unwillingness of several of the more important-countries to
offer aid .to Korea, some of which was due to local conditions of
immediate but temporary significance, there has alsoý been a ý,clear
in-
dication that a sufficient number of governments desire to participate
in such action to warrant an attempt to meet their requirements.
Furthermore, once the cooperation of a few countries has been ob-
tained, it is believed that others will fall quickly in line. (3) It will
be very difficult for unscrupulous military leaders 'to face the con-
sequences of misuse of military units which, as is pointedly indicated
in the 'General Assembly resolution, are to be clearly and expressly
maintained for possible action against aggression. (4) The danger
of such units' incurring the jealousy of other military units is recog-
nized, but it is believed 'that the desire to emulate the efficiency and
capabilities of such units may be a morale-building rather than a
demoralizing process. (5) The argument that U.S. aid will turn such
units into "mercenaries"l can only be met by making clear the obvious
fact that the dangers which such units are organized to deal with
are as great to the country receiving aid as to the U.S.


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