380


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


   12. The Kremlin might be prepared to accept in varying degrees
the risks of a general conflict by launching local armed attacks in
order to attain objectives regarded as of importance to the Soviet
Union. Without automatically starting global war by attacking Ameri-
can troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the
principal areas where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a
local purpose are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, or Finland. In addition to any one or more of these local
operations, the Soviets would still be capable of conducting with
surprise important operations simultaneously in Germany and Aus-
tria, in the Near, Middle and Far East, and-against the United King-
dom and the North American continent. Soviet forces are already
deployed in sufficient strength to give them the millitary capability to
act in m!rany areas. The following specific comments apply to: Iran,
Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Finland, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
  a. In the case of Iran,' it is possible but not probable that the Soviet
Government would regard the risk of general war as relatively small
while at the same time the acquisition of the Near Eastern oil fields
and the consequent domination of the European economy which would
result, and the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil region of the Soviet
Union, are important Soviet objectives. Overt USSR attack on Iran
would in fact give rise to the risk of global war.
  b. In the case of Turkey, the Control of the Turkish Straits and the
approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very important
military considerations ,from the point of view of Soviet defense as
well as a traditional and deep-seated Russian objective. The denial
of Soviet control of the Turkish Straits is vital to the security interests
of the United States. Therefore, ,a direct USSR attack on Turkey
would involve serious risk of precipitating global war.
  c. In the case of Greece, the control of the Peloponnesus and the
Greek Islands would present to the USSRý very important military
and political advantages. Geographically, Greece is a salient through
the ring of non-communist states which enclose the Soviet hegemony,
and its possession would provide to the USSR access to the Mediter-
,ranean Sea as well as a strategic position with respect to the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Dardanelles. Direct USSR
attack upon Greecewould probably precipitate global war because of
the political commitments and military and sentimental associations
of the'United Kingdom and the United States with Greece.
  d. Re-establishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia would bring
definite military advantages to the USSR. At the same time, the
Kremlin would have to weigh the political advantages of eliminating
a dangerous source of communist heresy against the political dis-
advantages of a Soviet armed assault on a communist regime, which
would tend to deepen rather than heal the disruptive effect of inde-
pendent tendencies in the communist-parties in'the free world. Unless
such an assault were quickly successful, the repercussions throughout
the foreign communist parties would be harmful to the Kremlin's
prestige and control of the international communist movement. Suc-