NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY


This qualification may be acceptable-but obviously only if the De-
fense estimate of the time factor, qvital to preparations for war, is
correct. It is indubitably requisite to, make the best estimate possible
of the probcable time when war may be expected to break'out, to enable
us not only to plan properly for expansion of our existing forces, but
to make the best possible deployment of forces in being. General
Omar Bradley is quoted in the same report (on testimony before the
House Appropriations Committee) as saying that planning was
originally based on a 1954 target date, which "we originally thought
was the dangerous period", but that "The present situlation has
caused
us to move that date down some, so instead of trying to plan on a
rising level of production and manpower and getting ready by 1954
we have had to step that up some for 1952." It is vital to test any
target date, including that of 1952, by ,all availalble measures.
  Having reference to the estimate in CA.s reference memorandum
of July 12, "Korea and Overall World Situation", that Moscow might
plan on war as early as the end of this year, the following factors are
outlined as pertinent to the question of the probable time that the
Moscow-Peking axis might undertake steps resulting in general war.
Major Indicators:
  1) Soviet intransigence in all political fields in 1950.
  2) Evident parallel Chinese intransigence, with relative uncon-
cern for (a) national economic welfare, (b) regularization of diplo-
matic relations with non-Communist States, and (c) membership in
the UN.
  3) Military moves in European and Asiatic sectors of the Com-
munist camp leading U.S. intelligence    o conclude that both the
USSR and China are capable of launching war across their 'frontiers
without further notice.
Straws in the Wind:
   1) Chinese intervention in Korea, practical refusal to accept a nego-
 tiated settlement.
   2) Soviet  warning    regarding   "consequences"  of  re-arming
Germany.4
   3) Tenor of Communist propaganda line warning the populations
of the USSR and satellite States that the USA plans war, with in-
creased recent emphasis.

  tThe Moscow statement that it "will not tolerate" the re-arming:of
Germany
cannot safely, any more than Peiping's threat to intervene in Korea if the
38th Parallel were crossed, be assumed to be a bluff. Cf. Abram Bergson's
letter, New York Times, December 17, 1950 (attached) for some cogent reason-
Ing. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding the possible rearmament of Ger-
many, see vol. ii, pp. 1 ff. The newspaper clipping has not been reproduced.]


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