FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 5 0, VOLUME I


be recognized that the Soviet movement is monolithic. Satellite troops
are just as much Soviet in this sense as if they were members of the
Red Army. The use of satellitic force, however, provides a convenient
cloak for Soviet activities and leaves the initiative in the hands of
Moscow to associate or disassociate themselves from such use of force
as it serves their own ends at any given time. Following this pattern,
satellite thrusts are possible particularly in the following areas:
            Formosa         Hong Kong-Mkacao
            Yugoslavia      Greece
            Berlin          Trieste (if Yugoslavia falls)
            Burma           Philippines (if Formosa falls)
            Indo-China      Austria (if treaty signed)
            Thailand
  3. Should the Soviets use the device of satellitic force in any of the
above quarters or elsewhere and thus attempt to destroy the leadership
and dissipate the strength of the United States and the UN'they might
then feel confident that they could move, without interdiction or with
relatively limited reaction, directly with Russian forces particularly
in any of the following areas:
           Iran                             Afghanistan
           Saudi Arabia (if Iran falls)
And they conceivably might be emboldened to take greater risks by
attacking
                      Berlin       Japan
                      Turkey       Pakistan
  4. Furthermore, North Korean successes or any additional moves as
mentioned above increase the possibilities of internal Communistic
coup d'etatsparticularly in the following areas:
                      Burma               Trieste
                      Formosa            Malaya
                      Thailand            Philippines
                      Indo-China          Berlin
                      Indonesia           India
                      Afghanistan         Pakistan
                      Iran                Italy
                      Iraq                France
                      Saudi Arabia        Austria
                      Yugoslavia          Iceland
   5. The magnitude of the more obvious "soft spots" is indicative
of
 the impossibility of the United States undertaking alone the protec-
 tion of the free world from Soviet aggression be it direct, satellitic or
 internal. In fact, we emphasize strongly that the situation in Korea
 is unique. There is no other place in the world-except those where


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