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The medieval village economy : a study of the Pareto mapping in general equilibrium models
- Author / Creator
- Available as
- Physical
Details
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- Creator
- Robert M. Townsend
- Format
- Books
- Language
- English
- Publication
-
- Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1993
- Physical Details
-
- xxi, 145 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
- ISBNs
- 9780691042701, 0691042705
- OCLC
- ocm26260355
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Ch. 1. Introduction. 1.1. Motivation and Outline. 1.2. Historical Background -- Ch. 2. Uncertainty and Landholding Patterns. 2.1. Statistics on Crop Yields. 2.2. Risk-Allocation in an Arrow-Debreu Model with Cross-Household Diversity. 2.3. Division of Land Types as an Ex Ante Solution to the Risk-Allocation Problem. 2.4. Spatial Division as an Ex Ante Solution with Costs of Fragmentation. 2.5. Multiple Crops and the Diet. 2.6. Risk Allocation with Multiple Goods and Preferences Aggregation over Diverse Households. 2.7. Multiple Goods and the Land-Crop Allocation Problem -- Ch. 3. Storage as Risk Reduction. 3.1. Some Striking observations on Carryover. 3.2. The Neoclassical Growth-Stabilization Model with Dual Storage Possibilities. 3.3. The Representativeness of Carryover Observations in Models with Internal Diversity. 3.4. The Adequacy of Storage as a Self-Insurance Device. 3.5. Carryover with Starvation: An Alternative Theory with Nonconvex, Nonseparable Preferences -- Ch. 4. Labor Arrangements
- 4.1. Some Observations on Disparate Landholdings and Labor Arrangements. 4.2. Consumption-Labor Allocations with Crop Production and Utility from Leisure. 4.3. Implications of Consumption-Labor Theory for Observed and Unobserved Arrangements -- Ch. 5. Rentals width Unobserved Outputs. 5.1. Monastic Payments. 5.2. Risk Sharing with Private Information on Crop Output. 5.3. Optimal Multiperiod Tie-Ins. 5.4. Costly State Verification -- Ch. 6. Sharecropping with Unobserved Inputs. 6.1. Share Rents among and within Villas. 6.2. The Moral Hazard Problem and the Nature of Optimial Sharing Rules. 6.3. The Gain from Randomization. 6.4. Efficient Intertemporal Tie-Ins. 6.5. Optimal Cross-Household Tie-Ins. 6.6. Economywide Reporting Systems -- Ch. 7. An Incentive Theory of Landholdings. 7.1. The Importance of Idiosyncratic Shocks. 7.2. A Numerical Example of Information-Constrained Landholdings. 7.3. Incentive Schemes with Costly Monitoring of Labor Effort
- 7.4. Landholdings with Indivisible and Privately Held Oxen -- Ch. 8. Conclusion
Subjects
- Manors -- Economic aspects -- England -- Mathematical models.
- Village communities -- Economic aspects -- England -- Mathematical models.
- Agriculture -- Economic aspects -- England -- Mathematical models.
- Land use -- Economic aspects -- England -- Mathematical models.
- Equilibrium (Economics)
- England -- Economic conditions -- 1066-1485.