Publication Details Click to collapse Cite/Export

  • Creator Martin Roth
  • Format Books
  • Publication Lanham : Lexington Books, [2018]
  • Physical Details
    • ix, 221 pages ; 24 cm
  • ISBNs 9781498539661, 1498539661, 9781498539678, 149853967X
  • OCLC on1004849093

Summary

  • "As neuroscience continues to reveal the biological basis of human thought and behavior, what impact will this have on legal theory and practice? The emerging field of neurolaw seeks to address this question, but doing so adequately requires confronting difficult philosophical issues surrounding the nature of mind, free will, rationality, and responsibility. [This book] claims that the central philosophical issue facing neurolaw is whether we can reconcile the conception of ourselves as free, rational, and responsible agents with the conception of ourselves as complex bio-chemical machines. [The author] argues that we can reconcile these conceptions. To show this, [the author] develops and defends an account of free will that identifies free will with the capacity to respond to rational demands, and he argues that this capacity is at the foundation of our thinking about responsibility. [The author] also shows how the mind sciences can explain this capacity, thus revealing that a purely physical system can have the kind of free will that is relevant to responsible agency. Along the way, [the author] critiques a number of arguments that purport to show that the kind of reconciliation provided is not possible. [The author] concludes that though we should rethink our legal system in important ways, both in light of his account of free will and what neuroscience is poised to reveal, neuroscience does not threaten the law's core commitment to responsible agency."--

Notes

  • Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents

  • Two images -- Fusion confusion -- Spiderman, doing whatever a spider can -- What a stupid I am! -- Dasein design -- Fusion finalized -- Bad brains -- MRIs are watching you -- Does the legal system have a diminished capacity? -- Court cases and legal doctrine