MARC Bibliographic Record

LEADER03409cam a2200505Mi 4500
001 991022214324602122
005 20171031092142.0
008 170606s2017 enk b 001 0 eng d
020    $a9780199672257$qhardback
020    $a0199672253$qhardback
035    $a(OCoLC)989039605
035    $a(OCoLC)ocn989039605
035    $a(EXLNZ-01UWI_NETWORK)9912371963202121
040    $aYDX$beng$erda$cYDX$dQGE$dOCLCF$dFIE$dCHVBK$dGUA$dGZL
049    $aGZLA
050 _4 $aK3173$b.K97 2017
082 04 $a340.11$223
100 1_ $aKyritsis, Dimitrios,$d1978-$eauthor.
245 10 $aWhere our protection lies :$bseparation of powers and constitutional review /$cDimitrios Kyritsis.
250    $aFirst edition.
264 _1 $aOxford :$bOxford University Press,$c2017.
300    $axi, 222 pages ;$c24 cm
336    $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337    $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338    $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504    $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 215-220) and index.
520    $aIn this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature's important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.--Provided by publisher.
650 _0 $aSeparation of powers.
650 _0 $aConstitutional law.
650 _7 $aConstitutional law.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00875797
650 _7 $aSeparation of powers.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01112740
650 _7 $aGesetzgebung.$0(DE-588)4020682-8$2gnd
650 _7 $aGewaltenteilung.$0(DE-588)4071817-7$2gnd
650 _7 $aKonformita╠łt.$0(DE-588)4073679-9$2gnd
650 _7 $aKontrolle$0(DE-588)4032312-2$2gnd
650 _7 $aMenschenrecht.$0(DE-588)4074725-6$2gnd
650 _7 $aRechtsprechende Gewalt.$0(DE-588)4177253-2$2gnd
650 _7 $aVerfassung.$0(DE-588)4062787-1$2gnd
650 _7 $aVollziehende Gewalt.$0(DE-588)4131719-1$2gnd


Document ID: 9912371963202121
Network Electronic IDs:
Network Physical IDs: 9912371963202121
mms_mad_ids: 991022214324602122